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Common Goods and Homelessness
This paper brings together the abstract concept of common goods and the concrete issue of 
homelessness. The phenomena of homelessness 
will be shown to challenge the naïve assumption 
that our political existence is grounded in a sense 
of goods we hold in common. And at the same 
time, a clearer understanding 
of what is involved in having 
goods in common will highlight 
a further dimension of the 
scandal of homelessness in our 
societies. I focus first on the 
notion of common goods and 
the demands they make on us. 
Second, I explore the reality 
of homelessness to show the 
challenge it poses to the liberal 
society’s confidence in its own 
basic premises. But before 
treating the conceptual material 
it is worth clarifying in advance what is meant by 
homelessness.
Homelessness names the phenomena of people 
having no homes to go to, nowhere to sleep, and 
so they sleep in the street, in doorways or subway 
passages. Also labelled rough-sleeping, it is the 
unmistakable reality encountered on the streets 
of most big cities. Identifying the phenomena 
does not commit us to explanatory accounts of 
the causes of homelessness. These can be many, 
at different levels, ranging from personal tragedy 
at the individual level, to housing policy at 
municipal or national government level. A crisis 
in housing provision can lead to an increase in 
rough-sleeping, as can budgetary cuts in welfare 
provision. Policy impacts on homelessness in 
various ways. Economic policy can lead to 
unemployment, housing policy can mean a lack 
of suitable accommodation, welfare provision 
policy can result in closure of units for the care 
of the mentally challenged who are ‘returned 
to the community’, cuts in subventions such as 
housing benefit can exclude young families from 
the private housing market. Causes are many, and 
each homeless person’s story is 
unique. But whatever might be 
the immediate causes in any one 
person’s history, the situation of 
the homeless, lacking a place to 
go, is common to all.
Tamsen Courtenay (2018) 
has published a collection of 
interviews with homeless people 
in London. She gives it the title 
Four feet under, because the 
people she presents live their 
lives four feet below the rest 
of us, sitting or sleeping on the sidewalk. These 
interviews reveal the wide range of histories that 
can lead to the point of living on the street. For all 
their diversity, the one thing they have in common 
‘is that not one of them has a home’. A home is 
an address and having an address ‘means you 
belong. Not having one creates a whole world of 
pain and sorrow’ (2). Her interviews reveal the 
details of that pain and sorrow: without privacy, 
without shelter, having to cope with illness such as 
food poisoning, or fever; without security, fearing 
theft of everything from begged money to shoes to 
personal mementoes.
COMMON GOODS
Homeless people seem to lack so many goods and 
to be without a share in the common goods of 
society. To provide the analysis for the argument 
that homeless people are excluded from common 
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presents live their lives 
four feet below the rest of 
us, sitting or sleeping on 
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goods in which they ought to have a share it is 
necessary to recall what is meant by good, and by 
common good. Aristotle’s Ethics (1981) focuses 
on the goods, intermediate and ultimate, that 
people pursue. He asks what good would be 
worth pursuing as the ultimate purpose in life. 
His remarks are very general, ‘the good is what 
all things desire’, and ‘whoever acts, acts for some 
good’ (Riordan, 2008, 16-27). As action is for 
some good, so, Aristotle thinks, joint action is 
for some good in common. This insight lays the 
groundwork for his political philosophy, as in 
the early pages of The Politics (1972) he lists the 
examples of cooperation in a scale of complexity, 
from the basic partnership of male and female, 
through the more complex collaboration required 
in a household, then a village and a region with 
its various villages, until he identifies the most 
complex cooperative form of all, that of the 
polis or city. Again, we find Aristotle is abstract, 
or programmatic, in his account of the political 
community’s collaboration for goods in common. 
The polis is the form of community in which 
cooperation is able to provide all that is desired 
for the good life. The good life is contrasted with 
life itself, said to be the business of the household, 
focused on providing what is needed for survival 
and for continuing existence both as individuals 
and as community. Daily and generational 
reproduction is achieved in the household, but 
the city provides answers to the questions about 
life’s purpose. Citizens, Aristotle believes, are 
united in their comprehension of what is good 
and worthwhile, and what is lawful and just. At 
the heart of the city, the political community, is 
agreement on such matters. And it is the capacity 
for reasoned speech which marks the human as 
a political animal, in comparison with the social 
animals, who have voice to communicate. Only 
the human enters into a deliberation about what 
is worthwhile. Hence for Aristotle the importance 
of the public deliberation in the forum and in the 
assembly when convened as a court of law. Shared 
meaning is central to the political common good 
(Riordan, 2015, 83-96).
Aristotle makes another claim about the political 
common good: as all action is for some good, 
and all cooperation is for a good in common, 
so the highest form of cooperation is for the 
highest common good. This assertion will be 
later challenged by Christian thinkers like 
Augustine, who are not willing to concede that 
the greatest good of humans is achieved through 
politics. While acknowledging the strength of 
this revision, we don’t have to reject Aristotle’s 
insights completely. Even in our twenty-first 
century world we recognize that the sovereignty 
of the state entails that it is the ultimate arbiter of 
which organized pursuits of which goods can be 
tolerated by the political community. The truth 
of this is not undermined by the articulation of 
human and civil rights, setting limits to what 
the state may legitimately do to its citizens and 
others. Those limits are typically accepted by the 
political authority in a liberal state. In a Bill of 
Rights, for instance, the state commits itself not to 
interfere with the freedoms of conscience, speech 
and association, or with the right to property of 
its people. But always there is the proviso that 
such rights are exercised peacefully, and that their 
exercise is conducive to public order. Determining 
these exceptions is done by the public authorities. 
Even if the modern liberal state declares itself 
neutral about ultimate goods and does not attempt 
to guide people towards a specific vision of their 
fulfilment, it nevertheless maintains the framework 
within which the pursuit of all goods is publicly 
regulated. In this limited sense, Aristotle’s assertion 
of the highest good retains a validity.
Another point in Aristotle’s analysis still valid 
in our modern context is his assertion that the 
basis for political community is a shared view 
of what is good and beneficial. While this may 
appear to be negated by a contemporary denial 
that it is the business of the state to decide on the 
good for people, and an espousal on the part of 
the liberal state of neutrality towards the good, 
there is nonetheless a fundamental commitment 
in the liberal state to some dimensions of good. 
Those dimensions belong not among the ultimate 
goods, but among the means and conditions for 
fulfilment. The facilitation of human freedom 
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is a central good of the liberal state. But more 
significantly, the commitment to resolving conflict 
about goods by negotiation and conciliation is 
a foundational good for the democratic state. 
On this at least the citizens of a modern state 
might be expected to agree, that conflicts should 
be conducted in a political manner. In this case 
it remains true that an agreement about some 
dimension of the good is at the base of the 
modern state. Perhaps it would be wiser not to 
call it an agreement, since there is no moment 
in time at which all people together enter an 
agreement, but it is a shared meaning that sustains 
collaboration and co-existence in a political entity. 
This shared meaning is itself among the goods in 
common enjoyed by the community. However, it 
is a fragile good, and it may need reinforcement 
through deliberate action when it is threatened 
by movements more disposed towards violence 
in their handling of conflicts. The transmission of 
shared meaning happens through usual processes 
of socialization, but educational programs also 
make it their aim to resource students with 
an understanding of the values at the heart of 
their inherited political institutions. At times, 
those values and the point of the institutions 
can be taken for granted, and so be forgotten or 
overlooked. In the face of such forgetfulness it 
may be appropriate to undertake some deliberate 
measures to recall the shared meaning that sustains 
the political community.
The common goods of cooperation in a modern 
state include the whole range that form the agenda 
of government, from education, social welfare, 
employment, housing, health care, security, justice, 
and international relations. They include further 
the institutions and practices that are put in place 
to achieve the concrete objectives of policy in these 
areas, from law-courts and hospitals to schools 
and universities. And sustaining all of these are the 
shared convictions and values, the meanings that 
people rely on to explain what they do and why it 
is worth doing.
With Aristotle we can confidently say that 
wherever there is cooperation people act together 
for some good, and that good is theirs in common. 
But even though we can be confident about the 
fact that cooperation is for a common good, it 
does not follow that we can be confident in all 
cases in saying what exactly that good is, and what 
it comprises. Whenever we speak about common 
goods, whether as the ultimate end of human 
striving, or as the total set of conditions to enable 
individual persons and groups to attain their 
appropriate fulfilment, we must be honest and 
admit the limitations of our knowledge. When we 
explore and debate the appropriate conditions for 
human flourishing our knowledge is incomplete, 
and what we do know is subject to correction 
and revision. The term ‘heuristic’ can be used to 
express this nature of the notion of common good 
(Riordan, 2008, 27). It names something we are in 
the process of discovering (both the end of human 
flourishing, and the conditions to enable it), and 
while we don’t know fully what it is, we do know 
enough to enable us to rule out candidates that fail 
to be common goods.
Because of our ignorance and the fact that in our 
societies we are engaged in the pursuit of our 
wellbeing which is at the same time a process of 
discovery we need criteria to distinguish genuinely 
common goods from those that conceal sectional 
interest. Aristotle suggests two criteria, when he 
distinguishes different kinds of constitutions by the 
ways in which they pursue common goods and not 
the goods of rulers or the powerful, and when he 
contrasts different constitutions according to how 
comprehensive is their vision of the human good. 
The first criterion is: If the purpose of the political 
community is to be a common good, then it could 
only be such if it does not systematically exclude 
any individual or any group of persons from a 
fair share in the good for the sake of which the 
members cooperate. The second criterion focuses, 
not on the persons excluded, but on the aspects 
of human good that might be excluded: If the end 
pursued is to be a common good, then it could 
only be such if it does not systematically exclude 
or denigrate any genuine dimension of the human 
good. Where this second criterion will establish 
if autonomy is indeed a dimension of the human 
good, and if it is included in society’s perception of 
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its common good, the first criterion will check if 
any persons or groups are systematically excluded 
from a share in that good (Riordan, 2008, 28-9).
While in our pluralist situation there is unlikely 
to be agreement as to what exactly constitutes 
human fulfilment, we may perhaps be able to 
work towards agreement on the whole range of 
means and conditions we need to put in place 
to enable persons and their communities to 
thrive. Pope Paul VI in his 1967 letter ‘On the 
Development of Peoples’ succinctly summarized 
the common good as the integral development of 
every person, and of the whole person (§42). The 
two criteria derived from Aristotle are reworked 
in this summary. The fulfilment of every person 
reformulates the first criterion that no one be 
excluded. The integral fulfilment of the whole 
person reformulates the second criterion, that no 
dimension of human wellbeing be systematically 
excluded from our shared concerns in social 
collaboration. These criteria can also be identified 
in the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity. 
Solidarity, that we commit to the cause of those 
excluded, and subsidiarity, that in the name of 
caring for them we don’t deprive people or groups 
of their autonomy. With these two criteria we have 
a way of critiquing proposals or achievements as 
to whether or not they serve the common good. 
While we may not be able to say definitively what 
the common good is or what might enable us to 
achieve it, we can at least reject those candidates 
that fail to meet the criteria formulated, and so are 
excluded from the common good.
LIBERTY AS A COMMON GOOD
Autonomy, freedom, is central to our contemporary 
Western understanding of the human good. It is 
about agency: the capacity to be subject of one’s 
own actions, one’s own history, and not merely the 
passive object of social forces or of the actions of 
others. The freedom of each individual to identify 
for herself her own good and to be able to pursue 
it, in the sense of not being prevented or interfered 
with, is key to this mind set.
The correlative of this shared meaning of liberty as 
a foundational value is the recognized obligation 
on the state not to impose restrictions on people’s 
liberties unnecessarily. The core meaning of liberty 
was expressed by Thomas Hobbes (1996) as 
‘absence of restraint’, and this is what is taken up 
by Isaiah Berlin (1969) in the notion of ‘negative 
liberty’. While Hobbes sees the imposition of law 
by the sovereign as just such restraint as would 
impede liberty, John Locke (1970) formulates 
liberty as one of the natural rights, remarking that 
‘no one ought to harm another in his life, liberty 
or possessions’. It is to ensure the protection of 
liberty along with the other rights that people 
would be prepared to enter into society under law 
and submit to the rule of government. However, 
their consent to submit would not be given in the 
absence of assurance that the government will 
protect their rights (including liberty) against 
threats, and that the government itself will not 
threaten liberty. Where Hobbes formulates 
with clarity the core meaning of liberty, Locke 
articulates the obligations of the state regarding 
the liberty of subjects. John Stuart Mill (1859) 
takes the discussion further in arguing that 
whatever exceptions might be tolerated to the 
injunction that the state – or society through the 
pressure of public opinion – should not interfere 
with individuals’ liberties, the reason that such 
interference would be for an individual’s own good 
may not be one of them. It may be permissible 
to restrict liberty for the prevention of harm to 
others, or to society itself, but a person’s liberty 
should not be interfered with merely because he 
puts his own wellbeing in danger. Mill’s position 
has generated much debate, especially on the 
question whether it can be meaningful to consider 
an individual’s good in isolation from that of their 
social milieu, whether family, friends, or wider 
society. The point of this brief survey, however, is 
to underline the centrality of negative liberty, the 
absence of restraint, among the core commitments 
of a liberal polity. The liberal is highly sensitized to 
the possibility of interference by the state or public 
authorities, or any other kind of authority such 
as ecclesiastical authority, in the scope of action 
of a person in pursuit of her chosen vision of the 
good and its concrete realizations. Insofar as the 
common good of a liberal polity includes the sets 
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of conditions created and maintained for public 
order and the rule of law, we can say that the value 
of negative liberty is a key element of our common 
goods in a liberal pluralist society.
Ronald Dworkin is a major exponent of the 
current dominant vision of political liberalism 
(2011). He identifies autonomy, which he calls 
‘ethical independence’, as a core value. It is the 
capacity each one is supposed 
to have to choose for themselves 
the vision of the good and of 
the good life according to which 
they will shape their lives. But he 
stresses also the equal importance 
of this principle of everyone’s 
life (2000). Dworkin’s concern 
is that the guiding principles in 
each person’s life be freely chosen, 
and not imposed by others 
or by authorities. A person’s 
authenticity is jeopardized 
when others’ judgments about 
the goals and values of life replace her own. The 
dignity of persons, their self-respect in taking 
responsibility for their decisions is no different 
from one kind of life-shaping option to another. 
On this view, there is no distinction to be drawn 
between religious and other worldviews (Dworkin 
2013). Liberty, including religious liberty, is to be 
respected because the political community owes 
respect (including non-interference in the scope 
of autonomous action) to the independence of 
persons who take control of their own lives.
Dworkin acknowledges the distinction between 
negative and positive liberty but does not wish to 
separate them. Responsibility has both dimensions. 
“A theory of positive liberty stipulates what it 
means for people to participate in the right way. 
It offers, that is, a conception of self-government. 
A theory of negative liberty describes which 
choices must be exempt from collective decisions 
if personal responsibility is to be preserved” 
(Dworkin 2011, 365). These two kinds of liberty 
belong among the conditions for human wellbeing 
in a liberal democratic polity. It is a common good 
for citizens in our modern liberal democracies 
that the law secures a domain of action free from 
interference and restraint by authorities.
When applying the first criterion of the common 
good to an evaluation of our political regimes 
it will be appropriate to include the securing of 
liberty as a fundamental common good. If there 
is systematic exclusion of any individual or group 
from a share in the enjoyment of a good we pursue 
together, then that pursuit and the 
structures in which it is carried 
out fail to be common goods. 
If there is systematic exclusion 
of anyone from enjoyment of 
or exercise of liberty, then the 
common good is not realized.
HOMELESSNESS AND LIBERTY
Jeremy Waldron is an 
acknowledged authority on 
John Locke (2002) and has 
written extensively on rights. 
Accordingly, it is surprising to 
find him writing about homelessness (1993). 
But perusal of his article reveals exactly why 
the situation of the homeless is relevant to his 
concerns. As he formulated it in an earlier article 
on the theoretical foundations of liberalism, “…
liberals are committed to a conception of freedom 
and of respect for the capacities and the agency 
of individual men and women, and that these 
commitments generate a requirement that all 
aspects of the social [world] should either be made 
acceptable or be capable of being made acceptable 
to every last individual” (Waldron 1987, 128). 
The test for the adequacy of social arrangements 
is that everyone could support them. Homeless 
people could fit in the category of ‘every last 
individual’ and their experience could be a test 
of the adequacy of the respect actually shown 
to those particular men and women. Another 
motivation for addressing the topic is to counter 
the assumption that social concern presupposes 
a communitarian political philosophy and that 
abstract liberal premises could not motivate 
care for people in need. “If homelessness raises 
questions even in regard to basic principles of 
freedom, it is an issue that ought to preoccupy 
“If there is systematic 
exclusion of anyone 
from enjoyment of or 
exercise of liberty, then 
the common good is not 
realized.”
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liberal theorists as much as more familiar worries 
about torture, the suppression of dissent, and other 
violations of human rights” (1993, 309). He wants 
to illustrate how commitment to liberal values 
could generate a critical review of our societies 
which both affirm the basic good of negative 
liberty and accept the reality that many in society 
are denied that liberty.
Waldron invites us to consider the freedoms of the 
homeless, and how their scope of action is severely 
restricted by regulations, both concerning private 
property, and proscribing behavior in public 
places. It requires us to consider homeless people 
not simply as recipients (or not) of welfare, but 
as agents. It is not primarily about what society 
should do for them to meet their needs, but what 
society allows them to do for themselves. What do 
our societies allow homeless people to do on their 
own initiative to satisfy their basic needs, or more 
relevantly, what do our societies prevent homeless 
people from doing to satisfy basic bodily needs? 
He argues that the homeless people in our liberal 
societies are systematically denied their negative 
liberties. Negative freedom is the freedom to do 
what one chooses in pursuit of one’s own good 
without interference or restriction by other agents. 
Homeless people, who have no place of their own 
in which they can sleep, wash, cook and eat, and 
perform the excretory functions of urinating and 
defecating, are denied their freedom. He underlines 
that he is arguing in terms of negative liberty, 
not positive liberty. Private property rights create 
restrictions on freedom of movement and action 
– that is the nature of such rights, that they create 
powers for the owners of property to choose to 
exclude, or to admit. Where such restrictions 
apply, there is no liberty. Similarly, local ordinances 
create restrictions on certain activities in public 
spaces such as public parks, subway stations or 
passages, and sidewalks. These ordinances, too, 
restrict liberty. Considering the dense web of laws, 
both the exclusions from private property and 
local councils’ restrictions on what may be done 
in public spaces, the cumulative effect of so much 
restraint is that no liberty remains for affected 
people. Waldron formulates it powerfully: to be 
free is to be free to act; but acting presupposes 
being someplace where the action may be 
performed, given the bodily nature of human 
beings; so if there is no place where a person may 
perform essential actions of personal toilet, eating 
and sleeping, it follows that such a person is not 
free, having no place to be!
The lack of accessible (i.e. free of charge) public 
toilets for instance means that homeless people are 
not free to do what it is necessary that they be able 
to do for reasons of hygiene and health no less 
than personal comfort. The activities in question 
here are not placed on a par with those correlated 
with the human rights of freedom of assembly, 
freedom of religion, freedom of conscience, and 
freedom of speech. But that does not reduce their 
importance. They are conditions that must be 
fulfilled if people are to exercise their other rights. 
Because these conditions are taken for granted 
by all who have a place of their own to sleep, eat 
and wash, they are rarely formulated explicitly, 
and never in charters of rights. But where there is 
systematic restriction placed on such activities the 
denial of the conditions is tantamount to denial 
of the more elevated rights for which they are 
conditions.
The emphasis on ‘freedom of action’ must be 
noted. No place to act means no freedom to act. 
Waldron notes the slogan frequently adopted by 
advocates for marginalized people: ‘what use are 
rights and freedoms to those who are hungry, 
cold, wet and sick?’ He acknowledges the benign 
intention, and how the urgency of immediate need 
might override concern for freedoms of expression 
or of religion. However, he draws attention to 
the capacities of homeless people to manage and 
argues that they are very much aware of being 
denied the freedom to act to look after themselves, 
in those daily struggles to cope. That they are 
denied their fundamental liberty, denied their 
right, should not be ignored, especially in a society 
which places such high value on negative liberty.
Waldron counters the arguments that might be 
made in defense of the status quo, to the effect 
that while property (and business) owners deny 
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access to their places for the doing of certain 
acts, they do not wish to deny people their 
freedom to perform those actions somewhere 
else. Some other place. The importance of space 
is underlined. Where no place is left due to the 
myriad exclusions, the homeless person has no 
freedom to do what is necessary, because he or she 
has no place in which to do it. Waldron concedes 
that the cumulative effect of many restrictions by 
individual property owners and local government 
authorities is not intended by each excluding agent 
but is nonetheless the effect of their actions. The 
generalized restriction on the liberties of homeless 
people might be an unintended consequence 
of many actions of exclusion but the effect is 
undeniably that which to a critical liberal observer 
must appear objectionable as a denial of liberty. 
“From any point of view that values freedom 
of action, it ought to be a matter of concern 
that the choices left open to a person are being 
progressively closed off, one by one, and that he is 
nearing a situation where there is literally nowhere 
he can turn” (Waldron 1993, 330). There is no 
place he is free to be.
Courtenay’s interviews (2018) with homeless 
people in London anecdotally confirm the reality 
described here. She describes how she herself is 
seen as a homeless person, and at times wears the 
look of homelessness, from hours spent sitting 
on cold and wet pavements in wind and rain 
listening to her interviewees. Treated inhospitably 
in cafes in which she tries to buy food and drink, 
subjected to suspicion or refused admission to 
toilets in shops and restaurants, she experiences at 
first hand what is the daily reality of the homeless 
(48). For those made homeless because of tragic 
circumstances, the hope of recovery sustaining the 
daily struggle is undermined by the difficulty of 
keeping clean, maintaining a decent appearance, 
avoiding the temptations of escape in alcohol or 
drugs, and remaining safe when sleeping rough 
exposed to the violence or ill will of many. As if in 
support of Waldron’s analysis, she remarks on how 
the lack of a home, a place to be and to do what is 
necessary, results in two conditions that undermine 
the capacity for action: sleep deprivation, and 
malnutrition. Sleep deprivation is a common 
problem of homeless people, since their sleep is 
frequently interrupted and rarely sufficient. This 
affects their ability to think and speak:
Your energy tank is empty, your brain 
is spaghetti, but still local councils and 
government expect you to pull yourself 
together and get organised so that you can 
get back into mainstream society… How 
are you supposed to correctly fill in loads 
of forms for hostels/housing, account for 
your movements over the last x-periods 
or remember to take your medications…? 
(Courtenay, 2018, 190)
Her concluding remark ties this experience in 
with the protection of basic rights: “If Amnesty 
International classifies sleep deprivation as a form 
of torture and Article 22 of the Third Geneva 
Convention, 1949… says that a person can’t be 
treated like this, how can it be that what is so 
contentious in Guantánamo Bay is apparently 
quite OK on the Tottenham Court Road?” 
(Courtenay, 2018, 191).
Malnutrition is the other common problem of 
the homeless. Without hot meals and without a 
regular supply of vegetables and fruit, their diet is 
very imbalanced. Too much bread because of all 
the sandwiches they are given, and reliance on fast 
food that allows them to still hunger pangs but 
does not nourish, results in a steady withdrawal 
of resources for what is a hard and challenging 
existence on the street. “Cheap food is usually 
fast food and fast food is, well, junk food. This 
kind of fodder is useless at increasing long-term 
energy and does nothing for your immune system 
or your brain function” (Courtenay, 2018, 219). 
The lack of a home with a place to cook and eat 
results in malnutrition, and the consequent lack of 
energy and capacity to function. This is obvious 
once mentioned, but it illustrates the point at 
the heart of Waldron’s argument. Homelessness 
results in the loss of fundamental conditions for 
basic liberty, the possibility of acting to pursue 
one’s own good. And the irony is that our 
societies expect homeless people to act in their 
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own interests. Courtenay makes the point: “…the 
homeless are expected to get off their backsides, 
pull up their socks (if they’ve got any), get a job 
and get their lives together – and do it all against 
the backdrop of their almost uniformly appalling 
histories, mental illnesses, exhaustion and, to cap it 
all off, their malnutrition” (220).
She records those painful histories: a young man, 
John, who could not cope with losing his wife 
and child in a car crash, and his life fell apart 
(Courtenay, 2018, 76); Beth, a victim of rape as 
a child, and a history of running away from care 
homes, for whom drugs offered some escape 
(63); Scott, evicted from his apartment because 
the landlord objected to the behavior of his 
girlfriend and without an address, an essential 
requirement to regain his driver’s license and 
resume his work as a coach driver, he became 
unemployed (53); Brad ended on the street, 
losing his business and his home, because of the 
coincidence of misfortune, divorce coming at 
a time of serious illness and inability to work 
(86). A disproportionate number of those on the 
streets are former soldiers and war veterans, more 
represented than any other profession (153).
CONCLUSION
The argument relies on the fundamental premise 
that in our liberal democratic societies the 
securing of liberty is a common good. The shared 
meaning constitutive of our societies values 
autonomy and understands negative liberty as 
an essential condition for agency. These shared 
convictions illustrate Aristotle’s notion that the 
sharing of a view on what is good and lawful 
makes a political community. Institutions of law 
are created and operated to protect that liberty, 
and so they also are common goods understood 
as among the conditions for the flourishing of 
individuals and groups. The first criterion to test if 
a claimed good in common is indeed functioning 
as a common good, investigates if any person 
or group of persons is systematically excluded 
from enjoyment of the good that is pursued 
collaboratively. Homeless people in our societies 
are systematically excluded from the enjoyment 
of negative liberty, an important good in common 
institutionally secured in liberal democratic states. 
They are denied their negative liberty, because they 
are denied the physical space in which they might 
perform activities essential for personal and social 
wellbeing: ‘they have no place to be’. Applying 
the first common good criterion: the securing of 
liberty as an attribute of agency is central among 
the goods we pursue together and protect in our 
legal and political institutions; and it is evident 
that there is a significant group of people who 
are systematically excluded from enjoyment of 
this good that we pursue together; it follows that 
our legal and political institutions are failing to 
be common goods. The realization that this is the 
case should come as a shock to people committed 
to the value of liberty and to the defense of liberal 
institutions of law and government. That we are 
failing to deliver on this central claim at the heart 
of the shared meanings constituting our political 
communities is cause for shame and a call for 
action.
REFERENCES
Aristotle. (1972). The politics. (T.A. Sinclair, 
Trans.). Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Aristotle. (1981). The ethics of Aristotle, The 
Nicomachean ethics (revised ed.).  
(J. A. K. Thomson, Trans.). 
Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Berlin, I. (1969). Four essays on liberty. In H. 
Hardy (Ed.), Liberty. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Courtenay, T. (2018). Four feet under. Untold 
stories of homelessness in London. 
London: Unbound.
Dworkin, R. (2000). Sovereign virtue. The theory 
and practice of equality.
Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University 
Press.
Dworkin, R. (2011). Justice for hedgehogs. 
Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard 
University Press.
JoVSA  •  Volume 4, Issue 1  •  Spring 2019 94No Place To Be! 
Common Goods and Homelessness
Dworkin, R. (2013). Religion without God. 
Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard 
University Press.
Hobbes, T. (1996). Leviathan. J. C. A. Gaskin 
(Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Locke, J. (1970). Two treatises on government 
(2nd ed.). P. Laslett (Ed.). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Mill, J. S. (1859). On liberty. In H. B. Acton 
(Ed.), Utilitarianism, on liberty and 
considerations on representative 
government. London: Everyman. https://
doi.org/10.1002/9780470776018.ch3
Paul VI. (1967). Populorum progressio. On the 
development of peoples. Retrieved from 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/
en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_
enc_26031967_populorum.html 
Riordan, P. (2008). A grammar of the common 
good. London: Continuum.
Riordan, P. (2015). Global ethics and global 
common goods. London:Bloomsbury.
Waldron, J. (1987). Theoretical foundations 
of liberalism. The Philosophical 
Quarterly, 37, 127-150. https://doi.
org/10.2307/2220334
Waldron, J. (1993). Homelessness and the issue 
of freedom. In J. Waldron, Liberal rights. 
Collected papers 1981-1991. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Waldron, J. (2002). God, Locke, and equality. 
Christian foundations in Locke’s 
political thought. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/
cbo9780511613920
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Patrick Riordan, SJ is Tutor and Fellow in Political 
Philosophy and Catholic Social Thought, Campion 
Hall, Oxford.
